Modal Logic via Global Consequence by Wen, Xuefeng
ar
X
iv
:1
91
0.
02
44
6v
1 
 [c
s.L
O]
  6
 O
ct 
20
19 Modal Logic via Global Consequence
Xuefeng Wen
Institute of Logic and Cognition
Sun Yat-sen University
wxflogic@gmail.com
Abstract
In modal logic, semantic consequence is usually defined locally by truth
preservation at all worlds in all models (with respect to a class of frames). It
can also be defined globally by truth preservation in all models (with respect
to a class of frames). The latter is called global consequence, which is much
less studied than the standard local one. In this paper we first study the
relationship between local and global consequence. Then we give some cor-
respondence results for global consequence. Finally, we illustrate two appli-
cations of global consequence, connecting it with informational consequence
and update consequence proposed in formal semantics. Some results in the
paper are already known, which are collected in the paper for the sake of com-
pleteness. The others appear to be new. We suggest that global consequence
is not only interesting theoretically, but also useful for application.
1 Introduction
Given a class of frames F, the inference from Γ to ϕ is valid with respect to F, if
for every world w in every model M = (W,R, V ) such that F = (W,R) is a frame
in F, if all formulas in Γ are true at w in M then ϕ is also true at w in M. This is
called the local consequence (or local validity) in modal logic, which is the standard
one. Another notion called global consequence (or global validity) in modal logic
is also defined in the literature (e.g. in [1]). The inference from Γ to ϕ is globally
valid with respect to F, if for every model M = (W,R, V ) such that F = (W,R) is
a frame in F, if all formulas in Γ are true in M then ϕ is also true in M, where
a formula is true in a model if it is true at all worlds in the model. Compare to
local consequence, global consequence is much less studied. Notable exceptions
include, [9], [5] and [11]. Kracht [9] studied global consequence from an algebraic
point of view systematically. Fitting [5] integrated local and global consequence
into a ternary relation, and proved completeness for various kinds of proof systems.
Ma and Chen [11] presented Gentzen-style sequent calculi for global consequence.
This paper studies global consequence within the standard relational semantics of
modal logic, emphasizing its connection with local consequence and some other
consequence notions, which were proposed for natural language arguments.
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In the sequel, we consider only normal modal logics. Let L0 be the classical
propositional language, L✷ the basic modal language. We use  (with or without
subscripts) for local consequence and g (with or without subscripts) for global
consequence, respectively. We use  for satisfaction relation. We write M, w  Γ
if M, w  ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Γ. We write M  ϕ if M, w  ϕ for all w in M, and
F  ϕ if M  ϕ for all M based on F. We denote by ⊢S the (local) syntactic
consequence for the axiomatic system S. We denote by K be the class of all frames,
and M the class of all models. We assume the readers are familiar with notations
for typical classes of frames and axiomatic systems. For example, K4 refers to the
class of transitive frames, and S5 the class of frames with equivalent relations; K4
and S5 denote their corresponding axiomatic systems, respectively. Some other
notations: ✷0ϕ = ϕ, ✷n+1ϕ = ✷✷nϕ, ✷rϕ := ϕ ∧ ✷ϕ, ✷Γ := {✷ϕ | ϕ ∈ Γ},
✷rΓ := {✷rϕ | ϕ ∈ Γ}, ✷ωΓ := {✷nψ | n ∈ N, ψ ∈ Γ}, ✷ωϕ := ✷ω{ϕ}.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the
relationship between local consequence and global consequence. Section 3 gives
a general correspondence result for global consequence and its typical instances.
Section 4 illustrates two applications of global consequence, connecting it with
informational consequence and update consequence proposed in formal semantics.
Section 5 concludes the paper. Some results in the paper are already known, which
are collected in the paper for the sake of completeness. The others are supposed
to be new.
2 Relationship Between Local and Global Conse-
quence
For a start, the following are well known results that connect local and global
consequence.
Fact 1. For any class of frames F, for any Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L✷,
(1) g
F
ϕ iff F ϕ;
(2) Γ F ϕ implies Γ 
g
F
ϕ.
Since local and global valid formulas coincide, we are more interested in global
consequence rather than globally valid formulas. The following fact can be easily
verified, which says that local consequence and global consequence coincide for
modal-free formulas. This may be the reason why for modal-free reasoning, we do
not distinguish local and global consequence.
Fact 2. Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L0. Then for any class of frames, Γ 
g
F
ϕ iff Γ F ϕ.
The following two known results show that if we add some global operators in
the language, then global consequence can always be defined by local consequence.
Before that we need two definitions for the global operators.
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Definition 3. Given a model M = (W,R, V ), define the operator ⊞ as follows,
M, w  ⊞ϕ iff for all u ∈ R∗(w),M, u  ϕ,
where R∗ is the reflexive and transitive closure of R.
Definition 4. Given a model M = (W,R, V ), define the universal operator A as
follows,
M, w  Aϕ iff for all u ∈W,M, u  ϕ.
Proposition 5 ([15], p. 159). For any class of frames F, Γ g
F
ϕ iff ⊞Γ F ⊞ϕ.
Proposition 6 ([7], Proposition 2.1). For any class of frames F, Γ g
F
ϕ iff AΓ F ϕ
iff AΓ F Aϕ.
If we consider only the class of frames K, then global consequence can be defined
by local consequence within the basic modal language, as the following proposition
shows.
Proposition 7 ([1], p. 32). For any Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L✷, Γ 
g
K
ϕ iff ✷ωΓ K ϕ.
The proposition appears as an exercise in [1]. Instead of proving it directly, we
generalize it as follows.
Theorem 8. Let F be any class of frames that is closed under point generated
subframes. Then for any Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L✷, Γ 
g
F
ϕ iff ✷ωΓ F ϕ.
Proof. ⇒) Suppose ✷ωΓ 2F ϕ. Then there exist a frame F in F, a valuation V on
F, and a world w in F such that F, V, w  ✷ωΓ but F, V, w 1 ϕ. Let (F′, V ′) be the
model generated by w from (F, V ). Then F′, V ′, w  ✷ωΓ and F′, V ′, w 1 ϕ. From
the former, it follows that F′, V ′  Γ, since all worlds in F′ are accessible from w
in finite (including zero) steps. From the latter, it follows that F′, V ′ 1 ϕ. Since F
is closed under subframes, F′ is also in F. Thus, Γ 2g
F
ϕ.
⇐) Suppose Γ 2g
F
ϕ. Then there exists a frame F in F and a valuation V on
F such that F, V  Γ but F, V 1 ϕ. From the latter, it follows that there exists a
world w in F such that F, V, w 1 ϕ. From the former, it follows that every ψ ∈ Γ
is true at all worlds in F. Thereby, it can be easily verified by induction that ✷nψ
is true at all worlds in F for all ψ ∈ Γ and n ∈ N. In particular, F, V, w  ✷ωΓ.
Hence, ✷ωΓ 2F ϕ.
Note that the direction from right to left does not require F to be closed under
point generated subframes. The other direction, however, does not hold for all F,
as the following fact shows.
Fact 9. There exist a class of frames F and formulas Γ∪{ϕ} such that Γ g
F
ϕ but
✷
ωΓ 2F ϕ.
Proof. Let F = {F} with F = ({w, u}, (w, u)). Then for any valuation V on F,
F, V 1 ✷⊥, since F, V, w 1 ✷⊥. Hence, ✷⊥ g
F
⊥. On the other hand, given
any valuation V on F, F, V, u  ✷n✷⊥ for all n ∈ N, but F, V, u 1 ⊥. Hence,
✷
ω
✷⊥ 2F ⊥.
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In [4, p. 425], the authors claim that the equivalence between Γ g
F
ϕ and
✷
ωΓ F ϕ holds for all F, which is incorrect by the above fact. But the closure
under point generated subframes is not a necessary condition for the equivalence
in Theorem 8, as the following fact shows.
Fact 10. There exists a class of frames F that is not closed under point generated
subframes such that for any Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L✷, Γ 
g
F
ϕ iff ✷ωΓ F ϕ.
Proof. Consider F = {F} with F = ({w, u}, ∅). Obviously, F is not closed under
point generated subframes. The direction from right to left is easy. For the other
direction, suppose ✷ωΓ 2F ϕ. Then there exists a valuation V on F such that
either F, V, w  ✷ωΓ and F, V, w 1 ϕ, or F, V, u  ✷ωΓ and F, V, u 1 ϕ. W.l.o.g.,
suppose the former holds. Then F, V, w  Γ. Let V ′ be a valuation such that
V ′(w) = V ′(u) = V (w). It is easily verified that F, V, w  ψ iff F, V ′, w  ψ iff
F, V ′, u  ψ for all ψ ∈ L✷. Hence, F, V ′  Γ and F, V ′ 1 ϕ. Thereby, Γ 2
g
F
ϕ.
If we consider transitive frames, then the biconditional between local conse-
quence and global consequence can be further simplified, as the following corollary
shows.
Corollary 11. Let F be any class of transitive frames that is closed under point
generated subframes. Then for any Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L✷, Γ 
g
F
ϕ iff ✷rΓ F ϕ.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 8, noting that for any transitive frame F, F 
✷
nϕ↔ ✷ϕ for n ≥ 1. (Recall that ✷rϕ denotes ϕ ∧ ✷ϕ.)
To define global consequence by local consequence using only ✷ rather than ✷r,
we could add another constraint for the class of frames.
Definition 12. A class of frames F is closed under irreflexive point extension, if
for any frame F = (W,R) in F, for any w ∈ W with ¬Rww, any point extension
F′ = (W ′, R′) of F for w by u /∈W is also in F, where F′ is defined as follows:
W ′ = W ∪ {u}
R′ = R ∪ {(u,w)} ∪ {(u,w′) | (w,w′) ∈ R}
Theorem 13. Let F be any class of transitive frames that is closed under point
generated subframes and irreflexive point extension. Then for any Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L✷,
Γ g
F
ϕ iff ✷Γ F ✷ϕ.
Proof. ⇒) Suppose ✷Γ 2F ✷ϕ. Then there exit a frame F in F, a valuation V on
F, and a world w in F such that F, V, w  ✷Γ and F, V, w 1 ϕ. From the latter, it
follows that there exists u ∈ R(w) such that F, V, u 1 ϕ. Then from the former, it
follows that F, V, u  Γ∪✷Γ, noting that F is transitive. Let Mu be the submodel
of (F, V ) generated by u. Then Mu, u 1 ϕ and hence Mu,1 ϕ. Since Mu is
transitive, every world in Mu is either u or accessible from u. Thus Mu, v  Γ
for all v in Mu. Then we have Mu  Γ. Since F is closed under point generated
subframes, the frame underlying Mu is also in F. Therefore, Γ 2
g
F
ϕ.
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⇐) Suppose Γ 2g
F
ϕ. Then there exist a frame F in F and a valuation V on F
such that F, V  Γ and F, V 1 ϕ. From the latter, it follows that there exists w
in F such that F, V, w 1 ϕ. If Rww, then F, V, w 1 ✷ϕ. Since F, V  Γ, we also
have F, V, w  ✷Γ. Hence ✷Γ 2F ✷ϕ. If ¬Rww, let F
′ be a point extension of F
for w by u. Then it can be verified that F′, V, u  ✷Γ and F′, V, u 1 ✷ϕ. Since F
is closed under irreflexive point extension, F′ is also in F. Hence, ✷Γ 2F ✷ϕ.
Corollary 14. Let F be any class of reflexive and transitive frames that is closed
under point generated subframes. Then for any Γ∪{ϕ} ⊆ L✷, Γ 
g
F
ϕ iff ✷Γ F ✷ϕ
iff ✷Γ F ϕ.
Proof. Note that any class of reflexive frames is also closed under irreflexive point
extension. Thus we have the first biconditional from Theorem 13. The direction
from left to right of the second biconditional follows from the fact that in any
reflexive frame F, F  ✷ϕ → ϕ. The other direction follows from the fact that
for any class of frames F, Γ F ϕ implies ✷Γ F ✷ϕ, and hence ✷Γ F ϕ implies
✷✷Γ F ✷ϕ. Then using the fact that for any transitive frame F, F  ✷ϕ→ ✷✷ϕ,
we obtain the final result.
Remark 15. The above corollary can also be derived from Theorem 8, noting that
in any reflexive frame F, F  ✷rϕ↔ ✷ϕ.
Corollary 16. For any Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L✷, for any F in {K4,KD4, S4, S5}, Γ 
g
F
ϕ iff
✷Γ F ✷ϕ.
Proof. Straightforward from Theorem 13, noting that all F in {K4,KD4, S4, S5} are
closed under point generated subframes and irreflexive point extension.
The following proposition shows that to define global consequence by local
consequence, sometimes various classes of frames are attainable.
Proposition 17. For any Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L✷, Γ 
g
S5
ϕ iff ✷Γ S5 ✷ϕ iff ✷Γ S5 ϕ iff
✷Γ K45 ✷ϕ iff ✷Γ KD45 ✷ϕ
Proof. The first two ‘iff’s follow from Corollary 14. The direction from right to
left of the third ‘iff’ is easy. For the other direction, suppose ✷Γ 2K45 ✷ϕ. Then
there exist a transitive and Euclidean model M = (W,R, V ) and a world w ∈ W
such that M, w  ✷Γ and M, w 1 ✷ϕ. From the latter, it follows that there exists
u ∈ R(w) such that M, u 1 ϕ. Since M is transitive, we also have M, u  ✷Γ.
Let Mu be the point generated submodel of M by u. Then it can be verified that
Mu is reflexive, transitive and Euclidean. Moreover, Mu, u  ✷Γ and Mu, u 1 ϕ.
Therefore ✷Γ 2S5 ϕ. The last ‘iff’ can be proved analogously.
If we restrict premises to be modal-free formulas, then global consequence can
always be defined by local consequence (within the basic modal language), as the
following proposition shows.
Proposition 18. Let Γ ⊆ L0 and ϕ ∈ L✷. Then for any class of frames F, Γ 
g
F
ϕ
iff ✷ωΓ F ϕ.
5
Proof. ⇒) Suppose ✷ωΓ 2F ϕ. Then there exist a frame F = (W,R) in F, a
valuation V on F, and a world w in F such that F, V, w  ✷ωΓ but F, V, w 1 ϕ.
Let (F′, V ′) be the model generated by w from (F, V ). Let F′ = (W ′, R′). Then
F′, V ′, w  ✷ωΓ and F′, V ′, w 1 ϕ. From the former, it follows that F′, V ′  Γ,
since all worlds in F′ are accessible from w in finite (including zero) steps. From
the latter, it follows that F′, V ′ 1 ϕ. Noting that Γ is satisfiable and contains no
modal formulas, we can define a valuation V ′′ on F such that for all worlds in W ′,
V ′′ coincides with V ′, and for all worlds u in W −W ′, for every atom p, u ∈ V ′′(p)
iff w ∈ V ′(p). Then F, V ′′  Γ, but F, V ′′ 1 ϕ. Thus, Γ 2g
F
ϕ.
⇐) The same as that in the proof of Theorem 8.
Some of the above results can also be given syntactically. Before that, we need
some definitions. We define local syntactic consequence in an eliminational way, as
in most textbooks in modal logic (e.g. [3] and [1]) , i.e. Γ ⊢S ϕ iff there is a finite
subset ∆ ⊆ Γ such that ⊢S
∧
∆ → ϕ. The gist of this definition is to prevent the
application of the rule of necessitation to the premises in Γ, since the inference from
ϕ to ✷ϕ is generally not valid under local semantic consequence. On the contrary,
since we have ϕ g ✷ϕ, given a standard axiomatic system, the global syntactic
consequence ⊢g
S
can be defined in the same way as in classical propositional logic,
i.e. Γ ⊢g
S
ϕ iff there is finite sequence of formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕn such that ϕn = ϕ
and for each i ≤ n either ϕi ∈ Γ, or ϕi is an instance of an axiom scheme, or ϕi
is obtained from previous formulas in the sequence by applying the rule(s) of the
system. As a result, under global syntactic consequence, the rule of necessitation
is applicable to the premises. Now we have the following result.
Proposition 19. Let S be any axiomatic extension of K. Then for any Γ∪{ϕ} ⊆
L✷, Γ ⊢
g
S
ϕ iff ✷ωΓ ⊢S ϕ.
Corollary 20. Let S be any axiomatic extension of K4. Then for any Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆
L✷, Γ ⊢
g
S
ϕ iff ✷rΓ ⊢S ϕ.
Corollary 21. Let S be any axiomatic extension of S4. Then for any Γ∪{ϕ} ⊆ L✷,
Γ ⊢g
S
ϕ iff ✷Γ ⊢S ϕ iff ✷Γ ⊢S ✷ϕ.
These results can be obtained by the completeness of the axiomatic systems as
well as the above semantic results. They can also be proved directly by induction
on the length of proofs. We omit it here.
Conversely, local consequence can also be defined by global consequence, but
much harder. We need a local operator.
Definition 22. Given a model M, define the ‘only’ operator as follows:
M, w  Oϕ iff M, w  ϕ and for all w′ 6= w,M, w′ 1 ϕ.
Venema gave the following result in [15] (without proof).
Proposition 23 ([15], p. 159). For any class of frames F, for any Γ∪{ϕ} ⊆ L✷EO,
for any p /∈ V ar(Γ ∪ {ϕ})
Γ F ϕ iff {EOp} ∪ {p→ γ | γ ∈ Γ} 
g
F
p→ ϕ,
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where E is the dual of the universal operator A in Definition 4.
We summarize the results in this section as follows. Those with bold fonts are
supposed to be new.
Local by Global Global by Local
restricting L✷, for all F Fact. 2 Fact. 2, Prop. 18
beyond L✷, for all F Prop. 23 Prop. 5, Prop. 6
within L✷, for some F Thm. 8, Thm. 13, Prop. 7,
Cor. 11, Cor. 14, Cor. 16,
Prop. 17
Though within L✷ global consequence can not be reduced to local consequence
generally, many properties for local consequence are preserved for global conse-
quence. See [8, 9, 10].
3 Global Correspondence
If we consider the correspondence between modal formulas and first-order frame
properties, then there is nothing new for global consequence, since globally valid
formulas coincide with locally valid formulas. But if consider the correspondence
between modally valid inferences and first-order frame properties, then it turns out
to be much different for global consequence.
First, we have the following obvious fact.
Fact 24. ϕ g
F
✷ϕ for any class of frames F, in particular, we have
(1) ✷ϕ g
F
✷✷ϕ
(2) ✸ϕ g
F
✷✸ϕ
In contrast, ✷ϕ F ✷✷ϕ if and only if F is transitive, and ✸ϕ F ✷✸ϕ if and
only if F is Euclidean.
Fact 25. ✸ϕ g
F
ϕ iff F is globally isolated, i.e. for every F = (W,R) in F,
∀x∃y∀z(Ryz → z = x).
Proof. ⇐) Given any globally isolated frame F = (W,R) in F, given any valuation
V on F, suppose F, V  ✸ϕ. Given any x ∈ W , since F is globally isolated, there
exists y ∈ W s.t. for all z ∈ W , if Ryz then z = x. Since F, V  ϕ, we have
F, V, y  ✸ϕ. Then there exists z ∈ W s.t. Ryz and F, V, z  ϕ. By the property
of R, we have z = x. Hence, F, V, x  ϕ. Since x is arbitrary, we have F, V  ϕ, as
required.
⇒) Suppose F = (W,R) in F is not globally isolated. Then there exists x ∈ W
s.t. for all y ∈ W there exists z ∈ W s.t. Ryz and z 6= x. Let V (p) = W − {x}.
Then F, V, x 1 p and hence F, V 1 p. Given any y ∈ W , by the property of R,
there exists z 6= x s.t. Ryz. Hence, F, V, z  p and thus F, V, y  ✸p. Since y is
arbitrary, we have F, V  ✸p. Therefore, ✸p 2g
F
p.
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Fact 26. ✸✸ϕ g
F
✸ϕ iff F is globally transitive, i.e. for every F = (W,R) in F,
∀w∃x∀y∀z(Rxy ∧Ryz → Rwz).
Proof. ⇐) Given any globally transitive frame F = (W,R) in F, given any valuation
V on F, suppose F, V  ✸✸ϕ. Given any w ∈W , since F is globally transitive, there
exists x ∈W s.t. for any y, z ∈W if Rxy and Ryz then Rwz. By F, V  ✸✸ϕ, we
have F, V, x  ✸✸ϕ. Then there exists y, z ∈ W s.t. Rxy, Ryz, and F, V, z  ϕ.
By the property of R, Rwz. Hence, F, V, w  ✸ϕ. Since w is arbitrary, F, V  ✸ϕ,
as required.
⇒) Suppose F = (W,R) in F is not globally transitive. Then there exists
w ∈ W s.t. for all x ∈ W , there exist y, z ∈ W s.t. Rxy, Ryz, and ¬Rwz.
Let V (p) = W − R(x). Then F, V, w 1 ✸p and hence F, V 1 ✸p. Given any
x ∈ W , since there exist y, z ∈ W s.t. Rxy, Ryz, and ¬Rwz, we have F, V, z  p
and hence F, V, x  ✸✸p. Since x is arbitrary, we have F, V  ✸✸p. Therefore,
✸✸p 2g
F
✸p.
Fact 27. ✸✷ϕ g
F
✷ϕ iff F is globally Euclidean, i.e. for every F = (W,R) in F,
∀w∀x∃y∀z(Rwx ∧Ryz → Rzx).
Proof. ⇐) Given any globally Euclidean frame F = (W,R) in F, given any valuation
V on F, suppose F, V  ✸✷ϕ. Given any w ∈W , suppose Rwx. Since F is globally
Euclidean, there exists y ∈ W s.t. for all z ∈ W if Rwx and Ryz then Rzx. By
F, V  ✸✷ϕ, we have F, V, y  ✸✷ϕ. Then there exists z ∈ W s.t. F, V, z  ✷ϕ.
By the property of R, we have Rzx. It follows that F, V, x  ϕ. Thus, F, V, w  ✷ϕ.
Since w is arbitrary, we have F, V  ✷ϕ, as required.
⇒) Suppose F = (W,R) in F is not globally Euclidean. Then there exists
w, x ∈ W s.t. Rwx and for all y ∈ W there exists z ∈ W s.t. Ryz, and ¬Rzx.
Let V (p) = W − {x}. Then F, V, w 1 ✷p and hence F, V 1 ✷p. Given any
y ∈ W , by the property of R, there exists z ∈ W s.t. Ryz, and ¬Rzx. Hence,
F, V, z  ✷p and F, V, y  ✸✷p. Since y is arbitrary, we have F, V  ✸✷p.
Therefore, ✸✷p 2g
F
✷p.
Fact 28. ✷ϕ g
F
ϕ iff F is globally reflexive, i.e. for every F = (W,R) in F,
∀x∃yRyx.
Proof. ⇐) Given any globally reflexive frame F = (W,R) in F, given any valuation
V on F, suppose F, V  ✷ϕ. Given any x ∈ W , since F is backward serial, there
exists y ∈W s.t. Ryx. Since F, V  ✷ϕ, we have F, V, y  ✷ϕ. Hence, F, V, x  ϕ.
Since x is arbitrary, we have F, V  ϕ, as required.
⇒) Suppose F = (W,R) in F is not globally reflexive. Then exists x ∈ W s.t.
for all y ∈W , x /∈ R(y). Let V (p) = W−{x}. Then F, V, x 1 p and hence F, V 1 p.
Given any y ∈ W , since x /∈ R(y), we have F, V, y  ✷p. Since y is arbitrary, we
have F, V  ✷p. Therefore, ✷p 2g
F
p.
Fact 29. ϕ g
F
✸ϕ iff F is globally inverse reflexive, i.e. for every F = (W,R) in
F, ∀x∃yRxy.
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Proof. ⇐) Given any globally inverse reflexive frame F = (W,R) in F, given any
valuation V on F, suppose F, V  ϕ. Then F, V, w  ϕ for all w ∈ W . Since F is
globally inverse reflexive, F, V, w  ✸ϕ for all w ∈ W , i.e. F, V  ✸ϕ.
⇒) Suppose F = (W,R) in F is not globally inverse reflexive. Then there exists
w ∈ W such that R(w) = ∅. Let V (p) = W . Then F, V  p but F, V, w 1 ✸p.
Thus F, V 1 ✸p. Therefore, p 2g
F
✸p.
Fact 30. ✷ϕ g
F
✸ϕ iff F is globally serial, i.e. for every F = (W,R) in F,
∀x∃y∃z(Ryz ∧Rxz).
Proof. ⇐) Given any globally serial frame F = (W,R) in F, given any valuation
V on F, suppose F, V  ✷ϕ. Given any x ∈ W , since F is globally serial, there
exist y, z ∈ W s.t. Ryz and Rxz. By F, V  ✷ϕ, we have F, V, y  ✷ϕ. Hence,
F, V, z  ϕ. By Rxz, we have F, V, x  ✸ϕ. Since x is arbitrary, we have F, V  ✸ϕ,
as required.
⇒) Suppose F = (W,R) in F is not globally serial. Then there exists x ∈ W
s.t. for all y, z ∈ W if Ryz then ¬Rxz. Let V (p) = W − R(x). Then F, V, x 1 ✸p
and hence F, V 1 ✸p. Given any y ∈ W , suppose Ryz, by the property of R, we
have z /∈ R(x). Hence, F, V, z  p. Thus F, V, y  ✷p. Since y is arbitrary, we have
F, V 1 ✷p. Therefore, ✷p 2g
F
✸p.
Fact 31. ϕ g
F
✷✸ϕ iff F is globally symmetric, i.e. for every F = (W,R) in F,
∀x∀y∃z(Rxy → Ryz).
Proof. ⇐) Given any globally symmetric frame F = (W,R) in F, given any valua-
tion V on F, suppose F, V  ϕ. Given any x ∈ W , suppose Rxy. Since F is globally
symmetric, there exists z ∈W s.t. Ryz. Since F, V  ϕ, we have F, V, z  ϕ. Thus
F, V, y  ✸ϕ. Hence, F, V, x  ✷✸ϕ. Since x is arbitrary, we have F, V  ✷✸ϕ, as
required.
⇒) Suppose F = (W,R) in F is not globally symmetric. Then there exists
x, y ∈ W s.t. Rxy and R(y) = ∅. Let V (p) = W . Then F, V  p and F, V, y 1 ✸p.
Thus F, V, x 1 ✷✸p and hence F, V 1 ✷✸p. Therefore, p 2g
F
✷✸p.
Fact 32. ✸✷ϕ g
F
ϕ iff F is globally inverse symmetric, i.e. for every F = (W,R)
in F, ∀x∃y∀z(Ryz → Rzx).
Proof. ⇐) Given any globally inverse symmetric frame F = (W,R) in F, given any
valuation V on F, suppose F, V  ✸✷ϕ. Given any x ∈ W , by the property of R,
there exists y ∈ W s.t. for all z ∈ W if Ryz then Rzx. Since F, V  ✸✷ϕ, we
have F, V, y  ✸✷ϕ. Then there exists z ∈ W s.t. F, V, z  ✷ϕ. By the property
of R, we have Rzx. Hence, F, V, x  ϕ. Since x is arbitrary, we have F, V  ϕ, as
required.
⇒) Suppose F = (W,R) in F is not globally inverse symmetric. Then there
exists x ∈ W s.t. for all y ∈ W there exists z ∈ W s.t. Ryz and ¬Rzx. Let
V (p) = W − {x}. Then F, V, x 1 p and hence F, V 1 p. Given any y ∈ W , by the
property of R, there exists z ∈ W s.t. Ryz and ¬Rzx. Hence, F, V, z  ✷p and
F, V, y  ✸✷p. Since y is arbitrary, we have F, V  ✸✷p. Therefore, ✸✷p 2g
F
p.
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Note that for local consequence, a valid inference often has an equivalent dual
version. For example, ✷ϕ  ϕ iff ϕ  ✸ϕ. This equivalence, however, does not
hold for global consequence. For example, though ✷ϕ g ✷✷ϕ holds for any class
of frames, its dual ✸✸ϕ g ✸ϕ holds only for globally transitive frames. This is a
notable contrast between local and global consequence.
Parallel to a famous general correspondence result for local consequence, we
give a general correspondence result for global consequence, of which the above
facts are all instances.
Theorem 33. ✸i✷jϕ g
F
✷
k
✸
lϕ iff every frame F = (W,R) in F satisfies the
following condition
∀w∀x∃y∀z∃u(Rkwx ∧Riyz → Rlxu ∧Rjzu).
Proof. ⇐) Given any frame F = (W,R) in F that satisfies the above property, given
any valuation V on F, suppose F, V  ✸i✷jϕ. Given any w ∈ W , suppose Rkwx.
Then by the property of R, there exists y ∈ W s.t. for all z ∈ W if Riyz then there
exists u ∈ W s.t. Rlxu and Rjzu. By F, V  ✸i✷jϕ, we have F, V, y  ✸i✷jϕ.
Then it follows that there exists z ∈ W s.t. Riyz and F, V, z  ✷jϕ. By the
property of R, there exists u ∈ W s.t. Rlxu and Rjzu. Thus F, V, u  ϕ and
F, V, x  ✸lϕ. Hence, F, V, w  ✷k✸lϕ. Since w is arbitrary, we have F, V 
✷
k
✸
lϕ, as required.
⇒) Suppose F = (W,R) in F does not satisfy the above property. Then there
exists w, x ∈ W s.t. Rkwx and for all y ∈ W there exits z ∈ W s.t. Riyz and
Rl(x) ∩ Rj(z) = ∅. Let V (p) = W − Rl(x). Then F, V, x  ✷l¬p and F, V, w 
✸
k
✷
l¬p. Hence, F, V, w 1 ✷k✸lp and F, V 1 ✷k✸lp. Given any y ∈ W , by
the property of R, there exists z ∈ W s.t. Riyz and Rl(x) ∩ Rj(z) = ∅. Thus
F, V, z  ✷jp and F, V, y  ✸i✷jp. Since y is arbitrary, we have F, V  ✸i✷jp.
Therefore, ✸i✷jp 2g
F
✷
k
✸
lp.
4 Applications
4.1 Informational Consequence
In [18] Yalcin advocated a non-classical consequence relation, called informational
consequence. Yalcin noticed that if ✸ denotes epistemic ‘might’ or ‘may’, then
saying both ϕ and ✸¬ϕ seems inconsistent, which is not reflected in standard
modal logic. So he proposed domain semantics and informational consequence
(details below) to formalize this phenomenon. We will soon find that informational
consequence is intimately related to global consequence.
Definition 34. A domain model is a pair D = (W,V ), where W 6= ∅ and V :
PV → ℘(W ) is a valuation on W . Given a domain model D = (W,V ), that ϕ
is true at (w, i) ∈ W × ℘(W ) in D, denoted D, w, i  ϕ, is inductively defined as
follows, where D, i  ϕ means for all w ∈ i, D, w, i  ϕ:
• D, w, i  p iff w ∈ V (p)
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• D, w, i  ¬ϕ iff D, w, i 1 ϕ
• D, w, i  ϕ ∧ ψ iff D, w, i  ϕ and D, w, i  ψ
• D, w, i  ✷ϕ iff D, i  ϕ
Definition 35 (Informational consequence). The inference from Γ to ϕ is infor-
mationally valid, denoted Γ I ϕ, if for all domain models D = (W,V ) and i ⊆W ,
D, i  Γ implies D, i  ϕ.
It can be easily shown that under domain semantics, ϕ ∧ ✸¬ϕ I ⊥. But this
can also be achieved by global consequence for free.
Fact 36. ϕ ∧✸¬ϕ g
F
⊥ for any class of frames F.
Proof. Suppose F, V  ϕ ∧ ✸¬ϕ. Then F, V  ϕ and F, V  ✸¬ϕ. The former
implies that F, V  ✷ϕ, which contradicts the latter.
In [2], Bledin convincingly argued that the rule of reduction to absurdity and
constructive dilemma are not generally valid for natural language arguments. Rather,
their correct forms should add some modal operators. More precisely, Bledin sug-
gests that
• Γ, ϕ  ⊥ 6⇒ Γ  ¬ϕ, instead we have Γ, ϕ  ⊥ ⇒ Γ  ✸¬ϕ;
• Γ, α  ϕ,Γ, β  ψ 6⇒ Γ, α ∨ β  ϕ ∨ ψ, instead we have Γ, α  ϕ,Γ, β  ψ ⇒
Γ,✷α ∨ ✷β  ✷ϕ ∨✷ψ.
Bledin argued that informational consequence can perfectly predict the above
desiderata. But global consequence can do the same job as well.
Fact 37. Γ, ϕ g
F
⊥ 6⇒ Γ g
F
¬ϕ, instead for any reflexive and transitive F, we have
Γ, ϕ g
F
⊥ ⇒ Γ g
F
✸¬ϕ.
Proof. By Fact 36, we have ✸¬ϕ, ϕ g
F
⊥ for any class of frames F. But by Fact 25,
✸¬ϕ g
F
¬ϕ holds only for F that is globally isolated. For the remaining part,
suppose Γ 2g
F
✸¬ϕ. Then there exists a model M with its underlying frame in F
such that M  Γ and M 1 ✸¬ϕ. By the latter there exists w in M such that
M, w 1 ✸¬ϕ, i.e. M, w  ✷ϕ. Let Mw be the subframe of M generated by w.
Then Mw, w  ✷ϕ. Since Mw is reflexive and transitive, we have Mw  ϕ. Thus
Γ, ϕ 2g
F
⊥.
Fact 38. Γ, α g
F
ϕ,Γ, β g
F
ψ 6⇒ Γ, α ∨ β g
F
ϕ ∨ ψ, instead for any reflexive and
transitive F, we have Γ, α g
F
ϕ,Γ, β g
F
ψ ⇒ Γ,✷α ∨ ✷β g
F
✷ϕ ∨ ✷ψ.
Proof. By Fact 24, we have p g
F
✷p and ¬p g
F
✷¬p for any class of frames F. But
it is easily verified that p ∨ ¬p 2g{F} ✷p ∨ ✷¬p, where F = ({1, 2}, {(1, 2), (2, 1)}).
For the remaining part, suppose Γ, α g
F
ϕ and Γ, β g
F
ψ. Let M be any model
with its underlying frame in F. Suppose M  Γ and M  ✷α∨✷β. Given any w in
M, we have M, w  ✷α ∨ ✷β. Then either M, w  ✷α or M, w  ✷β. Since M is
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reflexive and transitive, if the former holds, then Mw  α. By Γ, α 
g
F
ϕ, we have
Mw  ϕ. Thus M, w  ✷ϕ. If the latter holds, then Mw  β. By Γ, β 
g
F
ψ, we
have Mw  ψ. Thus M, w  ✷ψ. Hence, M, w  ✷ϕ ∨ ✷ψ. Since w is arbitrary,
we have M  ✷ϕ ∨ ✷ψ, as required.
Indeed, Schulz proved the following general result.
Theorem 39 ([12], Theorem 2.1). For any Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L✷, Γ I ϕ iff ✷Γ S5 ✷ϕ.
By Proposition 17, the following corollary easily follows.
Corollary 40. For any Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L✷, Γ I ϕ iff Γ 
g
S5
ϕ.
Compared to Theorem 39, it appears that Corollary 40 better characterizes
informational consequence, since the former uses local consequence and by Propo-
sition 17, with local consequence not only S5 can be used, but also K45 and KD45
are attainable. But with global consequence, such multiple correspondence disap-
pears. On the other hand, Facts 37 and 38 show that if we just need to satisfy the
desiderata above proposed by Yalcin and Bledin, it is possible to consider only S4
instead of S5, as far as global consequence is used.
4.2 Update Consequence
Update semantics proposed by Veltman in [14] is also a popular semantics for
natural languages. In update semantics, two conjunctions can be defined. One is
static (as in [14]), the other dynamic (as in [16, 17]). To differentiate them, we
consider the following language.
Given the set of propositional variables PV , the language L✷; is defined as
follows:
L✷; ∋ ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | (ϕ;ϕ) | ✷ϕ,
where p ∈ PV , ∧ is the static conjunction and ; the dynamic one. We stipulate
that both ∧ and ; are left associated, so that ϕ1∧ϕ2∧ϕ3 abbreviates (ϕ1∧ϕ2)∧ϕ3,
and ϕ1;ϕ2;ϕ3 abbreviates (ϕ1;ϕ2);ϕ3, etc.
Definition 41. An update model is a pair U = (W,V ), where W 6= ∅ and V :
PV → ℘(W ) is a valuation on W . Given an update model U = (W,V ), define the
update function ·[·]U : ℘(W )× L✷; → ℘(W ) on U as follows.
• s[p]U = s ∩ V (p)
• s[¬ϕ]U = s− s[ϕ]U
• s[ϕ ∧ ψ]U = s[ϕ]U ∩ s[ψ]U
• s[ϕ;ψ]U = s[ϕ]U[ψ]U
• s[✷ϕ]U = {w ∈ s | s[ϕ]U = s}
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We say that s supports ϕ in U, denoted U, s U ϕ, if s[ϕ]U = s. We write U, s U Γ
iff U, s U ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Γ.
It is easily seen that for any U and s in U, for any ϕ ∈ L✷;, s[ϕ]U ⊆ s.
Definition 42 (Update consequence). We say that ϕ is an update consequence
of Γ, denoted Γ U ϕ, if for all update models U = (W,V ), for all information
states s ⊆ W , U, s U Γ implies U, s U ϕ. We say that ϕ is a sequential update
consequence of the sequence γ1, . . . , γn, denoted γ1, . . . , γn SU ϕ, if for all update
models U = (W,V ), for all information states s ⊆W , s[γ1]U · · · [γn]U U ϕ.
Sometimes, another operator _ for indicative conditionals is also defined in
update semantics (e.g. [6]), whose update function is given below.
• s[ϕ _ ψ]U = {w ∈ s | s[ϕ]U[ψ]U = s[ϕ]U}
It follows that _ can be defined by ✷ and ; as the following fact shows.
Fact 43. For all U and s in U, s[ϕ _ ψ]U = s[✷¬(ϕ;¬ψ)]U.
Now with _, sequential update consequence can be reduced to update conse-
quence.
Lemma 44. For any γ1, . . . , γn, ϕ ∈ L✷;, γ1, . . . , γn SU ϕ iff U (γ1; . . . ; γn) _ ϕ
iff U ✷¬(γ1; . . . ; γn;¬ϕ).
Proof. Straightforward from the definitions.
Now we prove that update consequence can be defined by global consequence.
Definition 45. Given a relational modelM = (W,R, V ), define the truth condition
for ϕ;ψ as follows.
• M, w  ϕ;ψ iff M, w  ϕ and Mϕ, w  ψ, where Mϕ = (Wϕ, Rϕ, V ϕ) is
given below:
Wϕ = {w ∈ W |M, w  ϕ}
Rϕ = R ∩ (Wϕ ×Wϕ)
V ϕ(p) = Wϕ ∩ V (p), for all p ∈ PV.
Given a relational model M = (W,R, V ), we write JϕKM for the truth set of ϕ
in M, i.e. JϕKM = {w ∈W |M, w  ϕ}.
Lemma 46. For any update models U = (W,V ) and U′ = (W ′, V ′) such that
W ⊆W ′ and V = V ′ ↾W , for any s ⊆W ,
s[ϕ]U = s[ϕ]U′ .
Proof. By induction on ϕ.
• ϕ = p. Then s[ϕ]U = s[p]U = s ∩ V (p) = s ∩ V ′(p) = s[p]U′ = s[ϕ]U′ .
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• The Boolean cases are easily verified.
• ϕ = ψ;χ. Then s[ϕ]U = s[ψ;χ]U = s[ψ]U[χ]U = s[ψ]U[χ]U′ = s[ψ]U′ [χ]U′ =
s[ψ;χ]U′ = s[ϕ]U′ .
• ϕ = ✷ψ. Then s[ϕ]U = s[✷ψ]U = {w ∈ s | s[ϕ]U = s} = {w ∈ s | s[ϕ]U′ =
s} = s[✷ψ]U′ = s[ϕ]U′ .
Lemma 47. For any relational model M = (W,R, V ) with R = W ×W and its
underlying update model UM = (W,V ), for any ϕ ∈ L✷,
W [ϕ]UM = JϕK
M.
Hence, UM,W U ϕ iff M  ϕ.
Proof. By induction on ϕ.
• ϕ = p ∈ PV . Then W [ϕ]UM =W [p]UM =W ∩ V (p) = V (p) = JϕK
M.
• The Boolean cases are easily verified.
• ϕ = ψ;χ. Then W [ϕ]UM = W [ψ]UM [χ]UM = JψK
M[χ]UM = W
′[χ]UM =
W ′[χ]U′ = JχK
M
ψ
= Jψ;χKM = JϕKM, whereW ′ = JψKM and U′ = (W ′, V ↾W ′
). Note that the fourth identity follows from Lemma 46.
• ϕ = ✷ψ. Then W [ϕ]UM =W [✷ψ]UM =
{
W if W [ψ]UM = W
∅ otherwise
=
{
W if JψKM = W
∅ otherwise
=
{
J✷ψKM if JψKM = W
J✷ψKM otherwise
= J✷ψKM = JϕKM.
Lemma 48. Given an update model U = (W,V ) and an information state s ⊆W ,
define Ms = (s, s× s, V s), where V s(p) = s ∩ V (p). Then for any ϕ ∈ L✷,
s[ϕ]U = JϕK
M
s
.
Hence, U, s U ϕ iff M
s  ϕ.
Proof. By induction on ϕ.
• ϕ = p ∈ PV . Then s[ϕ]U = s[p]U = s ∩ V (p) = V s(p) = JpKM
s
.
• The Boolean cases are easily verified.
• ϕ = ψ;χ. Then xs[ϕ]U = s[ψ;χ]U = s[ψ]U[χ]U = JψKM
s
[χ]U = s
′[χ]U =
JχKM
s′
= JχK(M
s)ϕ = Jψ;χKM
s
, where s′ = JψKM
s
.
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• ϕ = ✷ψ. Then s[ϕ]U = s[✷ψ]U =
{
s if s[ψ]U = s
∅ otherwise
=
{
s if JψKM
s
= s
∅ otherwise
=
{
J✷ψKM
s
if JψKM
s
= s
J✷ψKM
s
otherwise
= J✷ψKM
s
= JϕKM
s
.
Theorem 49. For any Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L✷;, Γ U ϕ iff Γ 
g
S5
ϕ.
Proof. ⇒) Suppose Γ 2g
S5
ϕ. Then there exists an S5 model M such that M 
Γ and M 1 ϕ. By the latter, there exists w in M such that M, w 1 ϕ. Let
Mw = (Ww , Rw, Vw) be the submodel of M generated by w. Then Mw  Γ and
Mw 1 ϕ. Since Mw is a universal model, by Lemma 47, we have U
Mw ,Ww U Γ
and UMw ,Ww 1U ϕ. Hence, Γ 2U ϕ.
⇐) Suppose Γ 2U ϕ. Then there exist an update model U and an information
state s in U such that U, s U Γ and U, s 1U ϕ. By Lemma 48, we have M
s  Γ
and Ms 1 ϕ. Since Ms is an S5 model, it follows that Γ 2g
S5
ϕ.
Corollary 50. For any γ1, . . . , γn, ϕ ∈ L✷;,
γ1, . . . , γn SU ϕ iff 
g
S5
✷¬(γ1; . . . ; γn;¬ϕ) iff S5 ✷¬(γ1; . . . ; γn;¬ϕ).
Proof. Straightforward from Lemma 44 and Theorem 49.
Note that the truth condition for ϕ;ψ is just the same as that for 〈ϕ〉ψ in public
announcement logic (PAL, henceforth. For an excellent overview of PAL and more
generally dynamic epistemic logic, see [13].). Thus ϕ _ ψ is just ✷[ϕ]ψ in PAL.
Hence, we can define the following translation from L✷; to LPAL.
Definition 51. Define t : L✷; → LPAL as follows.
• t(p) = p, p ∈ PV
• t(¬ϕ) = ¬t(ϕ)
• t(ϕ ∧ ψ) = t(ϕ) ∧ t(ψ)
• t(ϕ;ψ) = 〈t(ϕ)〉t(ψ)
• t(✷ϕ) = ✷t(ϕ)
Now we can define SU by the standard local or global consequence within
LPAL.
Theorem 52. For any Γ ∪ {γ1, . . . , γn, ϕ} ⊆ L✷;,
(1) Γ U ϕ iff t(Γ) ⊢
g
PAL
t(ϕ),
(2) γ1, . . . , γn SU ϕ iff ⊢PAL [〈· · · 〈t(γ1)〉t(γ2)〉t(γ3) · · · 〉t(γn)]t(ϕ).
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Proof. For (1), by Theorem 49, we have Γ U ϕ iff Γ 
g
S5
ϕ. Since ϕ;ψ has the
same truth condition as 〈ϕ〉ψ in PAL, we have Γ g
S5
ϕ iff t(Γ) g
S5
t(ϕ). Then
by the completeness of PAL (for global consequence), we have t(Γ) g
S5
t(ϕ) iff
t(Γ) ⊢g
PAL
t(ϕ). Item (2) follows from Corollary 50 in the same way, noting that
[ϕ]ψ ↔ ¬〈ϕ〉¬ψ and ⊢PAL ϕ iff ⊢PAL ✷ϕ.
It is well known that (single agent) PAL can be reduced to S5. It follows that
sequential update consequence in L✷; can finally be defined by the local or global
consequence of S5 within L✷. This in turn implies that L✷ has the same expressive
power as L✷;, for both update consequence and sequential update consequence.
Corollary 53. For any Γ ∪ {γ1, . . . , γn, ϕ} ⊆ L✷,
(1) Γ U ϕ iff Γ ⊢
g
S5
ϕ,
(2) γ1, . . . , γn SU ϕ iff ⊢PAL [〈· · · 〈γ1〉γ2〉γ3 · · · 〉γn]ϕ.
5 Concluding Remarks
Though global consequence can be defined by local consequence for some classes
of frames, it has its independent value for application. If domain semantics and
update semantics are considered to be good formalizations of natural languages,
then global consequence could also be useful for this application. Moreover, it is
more flexible than the former two, since we can consider different classes of frames,
which is absent in the former two semantics.
This paper is only a first step to the study of global consequence in modal logic.
For instance, is there a sufficient and necessary condition on frames for global conse-
quence to be defined by local consequence? Is there a Sahlqvist-like correspondence
between global consequence and first-order properties? How to compare the frame
definability between local consequence extended with universal modality and global
consequence? We leave these technical issues for future research.
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